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Abstract: As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development,            
measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing             
whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus              
on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads               
to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show             
that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically           
misinterpreted. 
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Introduction 
 
The main research program that aims at a beginning of an explanation of consciousness is               
based on a quest for the "neural correlates of consciousness" (NCCs): the minimally             
sufficient neural states that lead to a subject being conscious of a content ​(Chalmers, 2000​;               
Crick and Koch, 1990) . Researchers typically rely on a comparison between two types of              2
measurements for finding NCCs: measures of neuronal processes and measures of           
consciousness ​(Michel, 2017; Overgaard, 2015)​. By comparing measurement outcomes, one          
can judge which neural processes best correlate with consciousness. Establishing robust           
measures of consciousness is thus critical for this research program. Within this framework,             
the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), a four-step scale used by subjects to report the              
degree of clarity of their experiences, has been widely used to assess participants’ levels of               
consciousness of contents (Ramsoy and Overgaard, 2004). However, the development of           
the PAS in consciousness science faces the "problem of coordination", namely, the problem             
of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures the quantity that it is             
intended to measure (Chang, 2004; Mach, 1896; van Fraassen, 2008). 
Most critiques addressed against the PAS do so on the ground that it is an inaccurate                
measure of consciousness (Irvine, 2012b; Wierzchoń et al., 2014). In this paper, I argue that               
both proponents and critics of the PAS rely on the assumption that measures using the PAS                
are at least ​valid measures of consciousness, namely, that the PAS measures what it is               
intended to measure. On my view, the PAS fails to coordinate the quantity that it intends to                 
measure, i.e., levels of consciousness, with the main quantity that it intends to measure              
consciousness with, i.e., reported levels of clarity of experiences. I conclude by showing how              
the use of the PAS could lead to systematic mistakes in the search for NCCs. 
 
 
1 From the response criterion problem to the PAS 
 
Subjective and objective measures of consciousness are often distinguished (Irvine, 2012a).           
A measure of consciousness is objective if the experimenter ascribes a conscious            
experience to a subject based on her performance on a task. On the other hand, a measure                 
2 ​A content of perception is what is conveyed to the subject through perception ​(Siegel (2016))​. For                 
example, perceiving a red apple conveys the content ​there is a red apple​. In what follows, I will                  
assume that contents can be conscious as well as unconscious. An unconscious perception of a red                
apple conveys the content there is a red apple​, just as a regular experience of a red apple does. In                    
this article, I will often talk about contents being, for example, intense or not. This should be taken as a                    
shorthand for saying that, if the perception that includes this content is accurate, the perceived object,                
say, a flash of light, would have high luminous intensity. 
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 of consciousness is subjective if the participant is required to produce a report about her               
current conscious experience. In this article, I focus on the latter kind of measures. 
Subjective measurement procedures face a “response criterion problem”. When         
instructed to report whenever a stimulus is consciously visible, subjects must come up with a               
criterion to determine whether a subjective experience qualifies for the report. According to             
signal detection theory (SDT), a subject’s decision to report seeing a stimulus depends both              
on the accumulation of sensory evidence and on the subject’s response criterion determining             
whether to report seeing the stimulus or not (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). Importantly,             
categories such as “seen” or “unseen” are interpreted by subjects to set a response criterion               
depending on their own interpretations of these categories, such that stimuli that are only              
vaguely perceived might be reported either as “seen” or “unseen” (Merikle and Reingold,             
1998). Accordingly, it is difficult for scientists to determine report instructions that make             
sense for participants without introducing biases in the way in which they decide to report               
their experiences or not. Researchers must therefore make sure that subjects will report all              
the relevant experiences, and only those experiences, so that they can reliably infer the              
subjects’ conscious states from their reports. By doing so, scientists engage in a process that               
is similar to the process of calibration of measurement procedures observed in the natural              
sciences. 
Calibration is the operation of "establishing a reliable relation between the indications of             
an instrument and relevant features of an object" or phenomenon ​(Tal (2017))​. In the              
cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, researchers aim at establishing a reliable relation           
between a subject’s report and the presence or absence of consciousness of a given content               
in that subject. For that purpose, calibration is typically accomplished by giving a set of               
instructions allowing researchers to make sure that subjects report all, and only, those             
features that are relevant for the experiment. To this extent, the response criterion problem is               
essentially a problem of calibration (Spener, 2015). 
One of the main subjective measure of consciousness, called the Perceptual Awareness            
Scale (PAS), was designed to solve the response criterion problem (Ramsoy and ​Overgaard             
(2004))​. As ​Sandberg and Overgaard (2015) ​explain: 
Whereas the scientist has no external access to the contents of another person’s             
consciousness, one can still aim for a situation where reports stand in a "1:1              
relationship" with the relevant inner states. Thus, even if the scientist cannot confirm             
such a relationship, a participant can inform the scientist that he/she can tell the              
difference between different degrees of visibility, and use this information to create the             
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 experimental categories for report. This can only be done, it seems, by involving the              
participants in the creation of those categories. (p.181) 
The PAS was developed by asking participants to design their own scale for rating properties               
of simple geometric shapes (shape, color and precision), starting from "no experience at all"              
and ending with "a clear image" (although they were free not to follow these suggestions).               
Almost all subjects developed a scale with four categories: "no experience at all", "brief              
glimpse", "almost clear image" and "clear image". The "brief glimpse" category was used by              
subjects to report no awareness of form, color, or shape, but only a vague experience of                
having seen something. Since subjects designed these categories themselves, one can thus            
suppose that the PAS avoids the confound of imposing response categories that subjects do              
not correctly understand, or categories that would lead participants to rule out reports of              
some kinds of experiences. 
The PAS is not only used to ​detect ​when subjects are conscious of given contents and                
when they are not, but also to ​measure ​the ​level of consciousness of a given content.                
Indeed, it is assumed that subjects can be more or less conscious of some contents. Some                
contents are perceived "clearly and distinctly", and are thus highly conscious, while other             
contents are perceived unclearly and in a somehow degraded way, and are therefore less              
conscious (Overgaard et al. (2006)). As such, subjects introspect to produce indications,            
allowing experimenters to ​detect consciousness of given contents and to ​measure their            
levels of consciousness of those contents. In summary: 
A measurement outcome using the PAS is a statement that a subject has a given               
conscious experience, with a given level of consciousness, such that this statement is             
inferred from an indication, i.e., a subjective report resulting from the subject’s            
introspection calibrated by PAS-instructions. 
The crucial point with this definition of a PAS measurement outcome is that measurement              
outcomes are different from indications. In order to get from an indication to a measurement               
outcome, a scientist has to interpret this indication as indicating something about what one              
intends to measure, usually by using a theory (Tal, 2017). For example, in order to measure                
temperature, one must interpret a thermometer indication, such as the height of a column of               
mercury in a thermometer, in light of a theory that relates the volume of mercury with                
temperature. An indication, by itself, does not tell us anything about the phenomenon we are               
interested in (van Fraassen, 2008). Consequently, two steps must be distinguished in the             
production of a measurement outcome using the PAS. The first step is the use of               
introspection by a subject, given some instructions, to produce a report: this is the process               
that leads to a specific indication. The second step is the researcher’s interpretation of that               
indication as telling her something about the subject’s current experience and level of             
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 consciousness. This is only through this second, interpretative step, that subjective reports            
become measurement outcomes. 
Most debates focus on the first step of the production of measurement outcomes. Critics              
of the role of introspection in consciousness science argue that it is difficult to calibrate               
introspection such that it could provide reliable indications (Schwitzgebel, 2011; Irvine,           
2012a, 2012b). This argument focuses on the ​accuracy of measurement procedures, defined            
as the closeness of agreement between measurement outcomes and the true value of the              
quantity that one intends to measure (​International Vocabulary of Metrology​). On my view,             
these critiques are unnecessarily concessive to proponents of the PAS. The most important             
problem for the PAS is not a problem of accuracy but a problem of ​validity​, or, as                 
philosophers of science sometimes call it, a problem of coordination ​(Barwich and Chang,             
2015​; van Fraassen, 2008). A measurement procedure is valid if it measures the quantity              
that one intends to measure, and not a different quantity. The problem of coordination thus               
touches on the second step of the measurement procedure: what entitles researchers to             
interpret reports as indicating something about conscious experiences or levels of           
consciousness? While the problem of accuracy presupposes that reports are indicating           
relevant aspects of consciousness, the problem of coordination questions the assumption           
that reports should be interpreted as indications of consciousness in the first place. 
 
 
2 Consciousness science and the problem of coordination 
 
2.1 The problem of coordination 
 
Empirical measurement procedures typically require the coordination of two quantities. For           
example, the height of a column of mercury in a thermometer, a quantitative property, can               
play the role of an indication that is then interpreted in light of a theory of temperature to                  
generate a measurement outcome. To the extent that one can use a quantity such as the                
height of a column of mercury to measure another quantity, temperature, both quantities are              
coordinated​.  
Coordination requires some recognized regularities, so that one can discover the           
form of the functions that links two quantities. The problem is that it is difficult to know                 
whether variations in thermometer indications correlate with variations in temperature, and           
how so, before one is able to measure temperature ​(Chang, 2004; ​van ​Fraassen, 2008)​. The               
problem of coordination, in other words, is that good measurement procedures require good             
theories, but good theories require good measurement procedures. 
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 A first step towards solving this problem is the discovery of systematic correlations             
between variations in indications produced by measurement procedures and variations in the            
property that one intends to measure. This first step is crucial, since it is only through those                 
correlations that one is able to assess the validity of the measurement procedure, i.e.,              
whether the procedure actually measures the property that one intends to measure            
(Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). If variations in thermometer indications were to correlate with             
variations in properties other than temperature, such as, say, the color of measured objects,              
or their distance from the Eiffel Tower, thermometers would not provide valid measures of              
temperature. By analogy, a procedure for measuring consciousness is valid only if variations             
in indications produced by that procedure correlate with variations in the presence or             
absence of consciousness, or with levels of consciousness, and do not correlate            
systematically with other properties that are independent from consciousness. 
The various methods that aim at measuring and detecting consciousness all try to             
coordinate given quantities, such as confidence ratings ​(Norman and Price, 2015),           
post-decision wagers ​(Persaud et al., 2007), ​or visibility ratings ​(Sergent and Dehaene,            
2004), with the presence or absence of consciousness, or with levels of consciousness. As              
noted above, the main quantity concept used in the PAS is the "level of clarity of an                 
experience". From this perspective, the main question is whether subjects categorize and            
report levels of clarity of their experiences depending on how conscious of these experiences              
they are. If a wide variety of factors other than levels of consciousness could produce               
variations in reported levels of clarity, it becomes at least open to question whether the PAS                
is a valid measure of consciousness.  
I now argue that there are multiple plausible interpretations for all subjective reports             
resulting from the use of the PAS. As such, we have no reason to believe that the PAS is a                    
valid measure of consciousness. 
 
2.2 The PAS and the phenomenological fallacy 
 
There are a variety of factors other than levels of consciousness that might lead to variations                
in reported levels of clarity. For example, Irvine (2012b) argued that the reported level of               
clarity of an experience depends on the subject’s level of confidence that a content was               
present, and not on her level of consciousness of that content. However, it seems that levels                
of confidence and levels of clarity should be distinguished, because measures of            
consciousness using the PAS do not produce the same results as measures using             
confidence reports (Sandberg et al., 2010; Zehetleitner and Rausch, 2013). 
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 Rather, I suggest that reported levels of clarity of experiences do not vary depending on               
levels of consciousness of contents, but depending on levels of intensity and precision of the               
contents of consciousness. Fazekas and Overgaard (2016, 2017) argue that reported levels            
of clarity of experiences depend on two main characteristics of experiences: intensity and             
precision. The more intensely and precisely a content of consciousness is experienced, the             
higher the reported level of clarity of that experience. However, levels of intensity and              
precision of the contents of consciousness are not necessarily identical with levels of             
consciousness of those contents. Intensity and precision could be properties of the ​contents             
of consciousness, and not properties of consciousness itself. 
To understand this distinction, it is useful to go back to what Place (1956) called the                
‘phenomenological fallacy’: the error of concluding that properties of experienced contents           
are properties of experiences themselves. As Smart ​(1959) ​wrote against a similar mistake:             
"Trees and wallpapers can be green, but not the experience of seeing or imagining a tree or                 
wallpaper" (p.151). The same thing goes for clarity, intensity or precision: the contents of              
consciousness are clear, vague, intense or precise. But consciousness of these contents            
itself is neither clear nor unclear, it is not intense nor precise. To attribute intensity and                
precision to consciousness itself is to commit the phenomenological fallacy. Rosenthal           
(2018) made this point clear: 
Though variation in intensity of the content of a perception and in strength of awareness of                
the perception both affect overall experiential intensity, only variation that is due to the              
second source is strictly speaking a gradation of consciousness. It is plain that perceptual              
content can vary altogether independently of consciousness. Variation in intensity of           
perceptual content is not gradation of consciousness. One would think otherwise only on a              
theory that assimilates perceptual consciousness to the content of the perception, and so             
fails to distinguish subjective awareness of psychological states from the states           
themselves. (p.7) 
The phenomenological fallacy, and the distinction between properties of contents and            
properties of consciousness are of fundamental importance if one is hoping to solve the              
problem of coordination. Indeed, measuring a representational property of the contents of            
consciousness​ is not the same as measuring ​levels of consciousness of those contents​.  
To be clear, I do not want to deny that there could be levels of consciousness, that levels                  
of consciousness could contribute to experienced levels of clarity of contents, or that             
variations in reported levels of clarity could correlate partly with variations in levels of              
consciousness. All that is needed for my argument is that variations in reported levels of               
clarity do not correlate solely with levels of consciousness, but also correlate with the way in                
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 which contents are built as clear or unclear by perceptual systems, independently of the fact               
that these contents are conscious or not.  
Since variations in reported levels of clarity could correlate with both variations in             
properties of the contents of consciousness and variations in levels of consciousness, we do              
not know whether reported levels of clarity should be interpreted as delivering information             
about the former or the latter. Hence, for every subjective report using the PAS, two               
interpretations are available: either the report should be interpreted as indicating a given             
level of consciousness, or the report should be interpreted as indicating a given degree of               
clarity, precision or intensity of a subject’s content of consciousness. 
 
2.3 Validity and the PAS: an inference to the best explanation 
 
An alternative way to provide support for the validity of PAS measures could be to appeal to                 
the fact that PAS measurement outcomes correlate with those of other measurement            
procedures intended to measure consciousness. This strategy has been successful before.           
For instance, a measurement procedure relying on an electron-microscope can be shown to             
be valid if its results correlate with those of a different procedure, such as a procedure using                 
a light microscope, which one intends at measuring the same phenomenon (Hacking, 1981).             
Here, correlations between outcomes of different measurement procedures are best          
explained by the fact that both instruments at least partly measure the same phenomenon. 
I already argued that there are disagreements between results using the PAS and             
results using confidence ratings or post-decision wagering (Sandberg et al., 2010).           
Nonetheless, results of PAS measures correlate with so-called "objective measures" of           
consciousness, such as levels of performance in discrimination tasks. When subjects           
perform at chance level in sensory discrimination tasks, which is interpreted as indicating             
that they did not see the stimulus, they tend to use the lowest level on the PAS, and when                   
they perform above chance, they tend to use higher levels (Overgaard et al., 2006).              
However, this would indicate that the PAS is valid only if an agreement between several               
measurement procedures was a sufficient ​condition to confirm their validity (Borsboom et al.,             
2004). In order to make a case in favor of the validity of the PAS, one has to argue that ​the                     
best explanation of the correlation between measurement outcomes using the PAS and            
other measures is that the PAS measures levels of consciousness.  
On my view, the best explanation of the correlation between measurement outcomes            
of objective measures of consciousness and the PAS is not that the PAS is a valid measure                 
of consciousness, but that contents that are built by perceptual systems as being more              
precise and intense elicit better performances. Indeed, it does not really come as a surprise               
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 that when subjects are asked to discriminate between two stimuli with low contrast, low              
brightness and low intensity, their performance is worse than when they have to discriminate              
between two stimuli with high contrast, high brightness and high intensity. The way in which               
a content is built by perceptual systems as clear or unclear could lead to an increased or                 
decreased performance ​and to a report using high or low level categories of the PAS. As                
long as we are not provided with a reason for thinking that performance is better on                
discrimination tasks ​in virtue of the fact that subjects are more conscious of stimuli, it is hard                 
to see why a correlation between PAS ratings and performance should be interpreted as              
providing support for the validity of the PAS. Rather, the simplest explanation of this              
correlation is that contents that are clearer elicit better performances, independently of            
subjects’ levels of consciousness of these contents. Hence, one can explain the correlation             
between performance on discrimination tasks and PAS ratings without appealing to levels of             
consciousness. 
Next, I show why we should care about the validity of measurement procedures in              
consciousness science by arguing that the uncritical use of the PAS might have led              
consciousness science astray in its quest for the neural bases of consciousness. 
 
 
3 Neural correlates of what? 
 
In the search for NCCs, the minimally sufficient neural conditions for consciousness,            
scientists typically rely on a method called "contrastive analysis" (Baars, 1988). This method             
consists in comparing neural activity on trials in which a subject either consciously or              
unconsciously perceives a stimulus, for example, thanks to visual masking or binocular            
rivalry (Breitmeyer, 2015), while holding the stimulus constant. As such, it is thought that              
consciousness of a content can be manipulated as a variable, and one can thus record the                
neural states that best correlate with consciousness of contents, and do not correlate with              
those contents remaining unconscious. As noted by Overgaard (2006), one obtains NCCs by             
matching two measures: a measure of the neural activity of the subject and a detection or                
measure of the subject’s consciousness of a content. My view is that the use of the PAS                 
might have led consciousness researchers to mistake the correlates of the perceptual            
processes responsible for building contents as clear or unclear with the correlates of             
consciousness. 
The search for the event-related potentials (ERPs), or the measured electrophysiological           
activity of the brain, that best correlate with consciousness of contents provides a good              
example of the way in which the problem of coordination applies in consciousness science.              
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 There are currently two main candidates for the electrophysiological signature of           
consciousness: the N200, or Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN), a negative component           
which peaks at 200 milliseconds and is recorded in occipital and parietal areas (Koivisto &               
Revonsuo, 2010; Rutiku et al., 2016); and a late positive component, the P300 (or P3), which                
peaks at 300 milliseconds and is recorded in frontal areas (Del Cul et al., 2007; Sergent et                 
al., 2005). 
In this debate, most studies using the PAS to investigate the NCCs bring support for the                
hypothesis that consciousness correlates with the VAN (Andersen et al., 2015; Fu et al.,              
2017; Koivisto et al., 2010; Tagliabue 2016). The claim that the VAN correlates with              
consciousness is based on the observation that variations in the amplitude of the VAN              
correlate with variations of consciousness as measured by the PAS. For example, Andersen             
et al. (2015) found that variations in PAS ratings could be predicted from             
magnetoencephalogram (MEG) signals originating in the occipital lobe in the VAN time            
range, while MEG signals originating in the prefrontal areas in the P3 time range could not                
be used to predict variations in PAS ratings. This result has been interpreted as indicating               
that “occipital activity seems a more likely candidate for a neural correlate of perceptual              
consciousness than does prefrontal activation.” (p.9).  
However, this interpretation of the data assumes that variations in reported levels of             
clarity are best interpreted as indicating variations in subjects’ levels of consciousness. On             
the other hand, I argued that the different levels on the PAS might not correspond to several                 
levels of consciousness, but to several levels of clarity of the contents of consciousness. On               
this alternative interpretation of reported levels of clarity, the VAN does not correlate with              
consciousness itself. Rather, it is the best correlate of the clarity of the contents of               
consciousness. Hence, different interpretations of what the PAS actually measures lead to            
radically different interpretations of experimental results relying on the PAS. The view            
according to which the VAN correlates with a property of the contents of consciousness is               
perfectly compatible with the P3 component being the true NCC. Indeed, one could interpret              
the results as follows: first, a content is built as clear or unclear by perceptual systems, and                 
this event correlates with the VAN; second, this content becomes conscious, and this event              
correlates with the P3 wave. Such an interpretation of the data is not available if one                
assumes that the PAS is a valid measure of levels of consciousness. 
A neural correlate of the clarity of the contents of consciousness is not the same as a                 
correlate of consciousness of those contents, and measuring the former does not amount to              
measuring the latter. ​Analyzing what we measure when using the PAS is of crucial              
importance in order to interpret data, as it determines what purported NCCs actually             
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 correlate with. Without measurement procedures that succeed at measuring consciousness,          
and demonstrably so, one cannot hope to establish correlations between neural states and             
consciousness, let alone between neural states and levels of consciousness. That’s why            
measurement validity is so important. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the accuracy of measures of consciousness is debated, their validity is often left              
unexamined. Here, I tried to lay the conceptual groundwork for analyzing measurement            
outcomes provided by measures of consciousness, focusing on the PAS. I argued that, as              
long as the problem of coordination is not solved, subjective reports can be interpreted in               
various ways. Consequently, I showed that experimental results that rely on the PAS for their               
measures of consciousness remain ambiguous. The problem of coordination should not be            
overlooked: assessing whether purported measures of consciousness actually measure         
consciousness is a crucial challenge for future research.  
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